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THE LEGISLATIVE RECIPE: SYNTAX FOR
MACHINE-READABLE LEGISLATION
Megan Ma*& Bryan Wilson†
ABSTRACT— Legal interpretation is a linguistic venture. In judicial
opinions, for example, courts are often asked to interpret the text of statutes
and legislation. As time has shown, this is not always as easy as it sounds.
Matters can hinge on vague or inconsistent language and, under the surface,
human biases can impact the decision-making of judges. This raises an
important question: what if there was a method of extracting the meaning of
statutes consistently? That is, what if it were possible to use machines to
encode legislation in a mathematically precise form that would permit clearer
responses to legal questions? This article attempts to unpack the notion of
machine-readability, providing an overview of both its historical and recent
developments. The paper will reflect on logic syntax and symbolic language
to assess the capacity and limits of representing legal knowledge. In doing
so, the paper seeks to move beyond existing literature to discuss the
implications of various approaches to machine-readable legislation.
Importantly, this study hopes to highlight the challenges encountered in this
burgeoning ecosystem of machine-readable legislation against existing
human-readable counterparts.
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INTRODUCTION
Legal interpretation is a linguistic venture. In judicial opinions, for
example, courts are often asked to interpret the text of statutes and
legislation. As time has shown, this is not always as easy as it sounds. Matters
can hinge on vague or inconsistent language and, under the surface, human
biases can impact the decision-making of judges.1 This raises an important
question: what if there was a method of extracting the meaning of statutes
consistently? That is, what if it were possible to use machines to encode
legislation in a mathematically precise form that would permit clearer
responses to legal questions? This is the fundamental basis of the Rules as
Code initiative.
To recall, Layman E. Allen lamented about ambiguity in legal drafting
owed to syntactic uncertainties.2 In his fascinating study, he deconstructs an
American patent statute and notices immediately the complexity with the
word ‘unless.’ He asks whether the inclusion of ‘unless’ asserts a
unidirectional or a bidirectional condition.3 That is, does the clause mean (a)
if not x then y; or (b) if not x then y and if x then not y?
Though nuanced, Allen exposes an ambiguity that muddies the legal
force of the statute. An interpretation of ‘unless’ as a bidirectional condition
raises the question of what ‘not y’ would mean. In this particular case, this
could affect whether exceptions are possible in determining patent eligibility.
In short, for Allen, legislative language must have a clear structure.
This article attempts to unpack the notion of machine-readability,
providing an overview of both its historical and recent developments. The
paper will reflect on logic syntax and symbolic language to assess the
capacity and limits of representing legal knowledge. In doing so, the paper
seeks to move beyond existing literature to discuss the implications of
1
In “Emotional Judges and Unlucky Juveniles” Ozken Eren and Naci Mocan found that upset losses
(i.e., losses by LSU football team when it was expected to win) increase the sentence length imposed by
judges on juvenile defendants. See generally Ozken Eren & Naci Mocan, Emotional Judges and Unlucky
Juveniles, 10 AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON. 171 (2018).
2
LAYMAN E. ALLEN, LANGUAGE, LAW, AND LOGIC: PLAIN LEGAL DRAFTING FOR THE ELECTRONIC
AGE 76, (B. Niblett ed., 1980).
3
Id. at 77.
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various approaches to machine-readable legislation. Importantly, this study
hopes to highlight the challenges encountered in this burgeoning ecosystem
of machine-readable legislation against existing human-readable
counterparts.
I.

HISTORICAL ROOTS: SYMBOLIC LOGIC

The code of Hammurabi4 is frequently used as an example of how the
law has changed in form in order to improve access to the legal system, lead
to more predictable legal outcomes, and promote transparency. Through the
adoption of form, law can be understood as a body of knowledge that over
time has come to inform behavior through the production, dissemination, and
evaluation of the rules. Lawrence Lessig and Alex “Sandy” Pentland each
have highlighted this with the notions that code is law, and law is an
algorithm. More recently, concrete efforts have highlighted the business,
technical, and legal interests in combining law and code to do things that
each on their own is unable to do, including: analyzing public commit
patterns of openly maintained cryptocurrencies5 and demonstrating how
code could function as an antitrust mechanism to supplement areas where
the rule of law does not fully apply.6 As a sort of synthetic or artificial
intelligence of its own, the purpose of law has always been to measurably
improve outcomes of its subjects. Whether aided by machines or undertaken
entirely by humans (a technology of our own), this does not happen without
the socialization of linguistic models for rules.7
These ideas are not new. The ancestry dates back to twelfth century
logicians reflecting on the use of mathematically precise forms of writing.8
In the mid-1930s, German philosopher, Rudolf Carnap, reflected on a logical
syntax for language.9 His argument is that logic may be revealed through the

4

Michael Genesereth, The Legacy of Hammurabi, CODEX: THE STANFORD CENTER FOR LEGAL
INFORMATICS (Mar. 17, 2021), https://law.stanford.edu/2021/03/17/the-legacy-of-hammurabi/
[https://perma.cc/7JFQ-7EYT].
5
See generally Lorenzo Lucchini et. al, From Code to Market: Network of Developers and
Correlated Returns of Cryptocurrencies, SCIENCE ADVANCES (Dec. 16, 2020), https://advances.
sciencemag.org/content/6/51/eabd2204.abstract?fbclid=IwAR0REZe0VCRCZwySwR6C_FcG6FB6DZ
QLAFwhGyF6QTvbZmoOrMGxAONpk4k [https://perma.cc/2A5C-MXCA].
6
See generally Thibault Schrepel & Vitalik Buterin, Blockchain Code as Antitrust, BERKELEY
TECH. L. J., (2020) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3597399 [https://perma.cc/
UR6K-8CH5] (unpublished revised journal article).
7
See generally M.J. Sergot et. al, The British Nationality Act as a Logic Program, 29
COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM 370 (1986).
8
KEITH DEVLIN, GOODBYE DESCARTES: THE END OF LOGIC AND THE SEARCH FOR A NEW
COSMOLOGY OF THE MIND 54 (1997).
9
See RUDOLF CARNAP, LOGICAL SYNTAX OF LANGUAGE 2–4 (Amethe Smeaton trans., photo. reprt.
2007) (1937).
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syntactic structure of sentences. He suggests that the imperfections of natural
language point instead to an artificially constructed symbolic language to
enable increased precision. Simply put, it is treating language as a calculus.10
In this perspective, there is no consideration of language for the
intentions of meaning and interpretation. Logical syntax is merely concerned
with structure and is void of content.11 Though Carnap concedes that syntax
belongs to the scientific study of language that enables mathematical
calculation, this approach must be distinguished from semantics, or
semasiology. For Carnap, syntax importantly builds a system of reference.
In an analogy with the “complicated configurations of mountain chains,
rivers, frontiers, and the like,” geographical coordinates are mathematical
constructions that act as informative measurements of comparison to reveal
and analyze the behaviors of its “natural” existence.12 Symbolic language,
therefore, acts to investigate and identify consistencies and contradictions in
language for the purpose of clarifying its logical properties.
Since the 1950s, Allen had argued for the inclusion of symbolic logic
to develop a systematic method of drafting. The transformation of an
ordinary statement to a “systematically pulverized form”13 would lead to
specific and unambiguous legal expressions. Allen’s technique is suggestive
of two key thoughts: all statements are (a) composed of constituent elements;
and (b) built on logical relationships.
He uses implication/co-implication ambiguity14 to illustrate how
symbolic logic could clarify legal imprecision. He considers the conditions
for when a seller may rescind a contract or sale as an informative example.
Breaking down section 65 of the Uniform Sales Act into six constituent
components,15 Allen argues that even a “relatively simple and
straightforward statutory passage . . . often [has] a wide variety of possible
interpretations.”16 For the specific case of section 65, he found that there are
eight interpretations a court could take.17 Yet, of the eight, only one

10

Id. at 4.
Id. at 6–7.
12
Id. at 8.
13
Layman E. Allen, Symbolic Logic: A Razor-Edged Tool for Drafting and Interpreting Legal
Documents, 66 YALE L.J. 833, 835 (1957) (internal quotations omitted).
14
See id. at 855 (defined as whether the connection between two elements of a statement is
conditional or biconditional).
15
Id.
16
Id. at 857.
17
See id. (Allen conducts a simple mathematical calculation around the number of interpretations.
He notes that where the number of antecedents (otherwise, conditional statements) in the statement is
equivalent to N, the number of possible interpretations is equivalent to 2N).
11
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interpretation tends to be adopted by courts, owed to the contextual support
by other sections of the statute.
Allen suggests, by systematically pulverizing statements of the statute,
clearer intentions may be revealed. This method acts as a tool to counter
drafting in a “broad and ambiguous form.”18 More recently, Stephen
Wolfram made a similar argument. Simplification, he states, could occur
through the formulation of a symbolic discourse language. That is, if the
“poetry” of natural language could be “crushed” out, one could arrive at legal
language that is entirely precise.19
Machine-readability20 appears then to bridge the desire for precision
with the inherent logic and ruleness21 of certain aspects of the law. Machineconsumable legislation may, therefore, be regarded as a product that evolved
out of the relationship between syntax, structure, and interpretation. In other
words, a potential recipe to resolve the complexity of legalese. What Allen
intentionally evades, and is rather significant, is the difference between
semantic and syntactic uncertainty. While syntactic uncertainties are often
inadvertent, semantic uncertainties are often deliberate. The distinction
between syntactic with semantic uncertainty is a mirror to unintentional and
intentional ambiguity. This act of categorization implies the capacity to
delineate within natural language core tenets of ambiguity.
Therefore, the correlative association between unintentional ambiguity
and syntactic uncertainty is an audacious claim that innately reduces the
challenges of legislative drafting to a symbolic fix. For now, it appears there
may be a stronger argument that symbolic logic is better suited as a metric
to assess clarity and precision in legal drafting.
II. PLAIN ENGLISH LEGALESE
Marshall McLuhan famously theorized that the medium is the
message.22 Developments in law validate this idea. Legalese, much like law
itself, is expensive, fragmented, and inaccessible to many who would use it.
As such, symptoms of simplification—efforts to make text more
digestible—frequently emerge and re-emerge, working through cycles of
fashion in the legal industry.

18

Id.
Stephen Wolfram, Computational Law, Symbolic Discourse, and the AI Constitution, in DATADRIVEN LAW: DATA ANALYTICS AND NEW LEGAL SERVICES 103, 109 (Ed Walters ed., 2019).
20
While there are distinctions in literature between machine-readable and machine-consumable, the
author here uses them interchangeably and treats them as synonymous.
21
See Frederick Schauer, Legal Rules in Practice (Dupret Baudouin et al. eds., forthcoming 2021).
22
See generally MARSHALL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: EXTENSIONS OF MAN (1964).
19
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In the 1960s, David Mellinkoff described the absurdity of the legal
language bearing characteristics distinct from common speech. Mellinkoff
argues that while there is overlap between the two, the language of the law
frequently includes common words with uncommon meanings, use of words
and expressions with flexible meanings, and “attempts at extreme precision
of expression.”23 Perhaps the most interesting is Mellinkoff’s sly remarks at
the legal language’s valiant yet unsuccessful efforts with precision. He notes
the contrast between the plays on meaning against the sharp boundaries
around the vocabulary. In defense of precision, the arguments often invoked
by lawyers is of clarity; that the wording is justified in making the meaning
clearer.24 The cult around precision in law’s language has built a fortress
around change, projecting a fear that use of plain language would disrupt the
clarity associated with legal language.
Therefore, Mellinkoff seeks to debunk this myth of precision—the
elusive “exact meaning,” desired by lawyers, that keeps the technical
language afloat. Alternatively, he finds that the tools used in the legal
community do not reflect precision. First, agreement on what is necessarily
precise has never been reached.25 Precision is occasionally defined as being
exact or “exactly-the-same-way.” The former alludes to a definite term,
whereas the latter points at the mechanism of analogy and application of
precedent. In either scenario, Mellinkoff finds issue with the understanding
of precision. A focus on definite meaning is misleading as legal language
often includes vocabulary such as “reasonable,” or “substantial” that are
fundamentally imprecise. From the perspective of precedent and argument
for tradition, Mellinkoff suggests that precision is merely an effect produced
by law’s formulas. That is, “an inflexible primitive insistence on word-forword repetition could make the traditional the precise.”26 Embedded into the
legal language is an attachment to form as opposed to meaning.
Consequently, the arguments towards precision are, in fact, structural and
not linguistic.
Peter Tiersma, decades later, discussed the extent to which legal
language was effective as a means of communication. His conclusion was
that the goals of the language did not serve the intentions of the law. That is,
the desire to appear objective and authoritative conflicted with the use of
language in law. Tiersma suggests that legal language has come to be
understood as a method of exclusion, an indicator that one belongs to a “legal
23

DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW 11 (1963).
Id. at 292.
25
Mellinkoff describes this as “the choice of ‘precise’ language goes by default – without notice that
any problem exists.” Id. at 297.
26
Id. at 299.
24
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fraternity.”27 This incongruency enables a continued dependence on the legal
community to decipher and translate legal texts.
Tiersma highlights two elements that have worked against the use of
plain English in law: (1) the “quest for precision” in law; and (2) the legal
lexicon. The former acts as a shield against ordinary English, and the latter
is to distinguish law from other disciplines. Perhaps ironically, Tiersma
observes that the arguments for legal language – clarity, conciseness, and
precision – are also the causes of imprecision and lack of clarity. Like
Mellinkoff, he argues that the legal language strategically plays on
imprecision, flexibility, and generality of use, as well as a specific
vocabulary that is largely arcane and jargon.28 Moreover, interpretation plays
a different function in legal than in ordinary language. Tiersma suggests that
in ordinary English, interpretation is focused on the speaker’s meaning. In
legal interpretation, it is fundamentally a semantic exercise reinforced by the
aforementioned lexicon. The differences in the practice of language and the
reasons behind their use, in effect, lead to complications surrounding the
inclusion of plain English in law. Consequently, decades of effort in
converting complex legal language to plain English have been met with
minimal success.29
Nevertheless, there have been strong efforts of developing a plain
English for the legal community. Richard C. Wydick, inspired by Mellinkoff,
addresses the design problem raised by Tiersma. The underlying argument
is that “good legal writing is plain English.”30 Wydick suggests that
distinguishing legal from ordinary language hinders, rather than promotes,
legal work. Furthermore, he contends that there are several quick fixes to
translating existing legal language to plain language. In his text, Wydick
identifies issues of legal language as semantic ones of choice and
arrangement. The central discussion is on word use and how to manipulate
them “with care.”31 Grammar is equally relevant, considering foremost the
active voice and punctuation.

27
Peter Tiersma, Legal Language, LANGUAGE AND LAW (1999), http://languageandlaw.org/
LEGALLANG/LEGALLANG.HTM [https://perma.cc/K69N-H85U].
28
Id.
29
In addition to the ongoing dialogue towards a ‘plain legal English,’ it is perhaps best summarized
by William Pitt on the elusiveness and illusion of achieving this conversion. See William Pitt, Fighting
Legalese with Digital, Personalized Contracts, HARVARD BUS. R. (Feb. 27, 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/
02/fighting-legalese-with-digital-personalized-contracts [https://perma.cc/4CY4-4H76].
30
See generally. RICHARD C. WYDICK, PLAIN ENGLISH FOR LAWYERS (5th ed. 2005).
31
See id. at 33–54.
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There have been examples of Wydick’s suggestions in practice. The
Plain English Movement32 reflected an eager intent to increase the
accessibility of legal knowledge to those outside of the legal community.
This was owed to the rising demand for important consumer documents to
be made understandable to the general population.33 Similarly, this has
permeated into calls for plain English legislation. Guidelines of ‘good faith’
were written for legislation to use active verbs and short sentences and be
capable of passing the Flesch test.34
Despite the vast improvements to the language of consumer documents,
most legal documents continued to be written in legalese. If the shift from
legal language to plain English is as simple and intuitive as described by
Wydick, the question becomes: why have the peculiarities of legal language
and drafting persisted? In line with Tiersma’s suggestion, perhaps it may be
a result of exclusivity. That is, the complexity of the language fosters a
continual reliance on the legal community, reinforcing the need for a
knowledge translator. On the other hand, there may be a more subtle reason
for the preservation of legalese. This argument draws from Mellinkoff’s
discussion of tradition. Provided that legal language has always been housed
in a particular form, there rests an underlying hesitation that legal concepts
cannot be expressed in another way. Though Mellinkoff ascribes this to the
illusion of precision, it may in fact be an inability to reconceptualize the law.
This would imply a marriage to the form. In this case, enabling machinereadability would demand perpetuating existing forms of legal expression.

32
This began with revisions around promissory notes introduced by Citibank in the 1970s. See
Tiersma, supra note 26.
33
Id.
34
This was considered a “readability” assessment, as it measures the average length of sentences and
words. It was suggested that this acted as an objective and quantifiable measurement for
comprehensibility. See id.
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III. WHY DON’T WE LAYER IT? XML IN LAW
From plain English, there took a technical turn. Building on the
previous innovations to the technical infrastructure of law, there are new
opportunities enabled by the digital and the computational. As demonstrated
by the framework for licenses introduced by Creative Commons, contracts
can be structured in order to standardize legalese, develop human readable
summaries of complex ideas, and integrate them into a machine-readable
format.35

36

In hopes of developing a better understanding of legislative documents,
LegalXML and LegalDocumentXML, products of OASIS Open,37 were
created to provide a common legal document standard “for their interchange
between institutions anywhere in the world and for the creation of a common
data and metadata model that allows experience, expertise, and tools to be
shared and extended.”38 This standard-based approach focuses on assessing
the ways in which machine-readable information may be integrated into the
official text of legislative documents.39
For a document to be made machine-readable, a descriptive markup
meta-language,40 like eXtensible Markup Language (XML), must be
35

About the Licenses, CREATIVE COMMONS, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/ [https://perma.
cc/JNZ7-UHDR].
36
Layers, CREATIVE COMMONS (May 30, 2016), https://creativecommons.org/share-your-work/
licensing-considerations/layers/ [https://perma.cc/6FK5-FBGJ].
37
OASIS OPEN, https://www.oasis-open.org/[https://perma.cc/9R4J-MN4R].
38
OASIS LegalDocumentML, OASIS OPEN, https://www.oasis-open.org/committees/tc_home.php?
wg_abbrev=legaldocml [https://perma.cc/FLP8-P3J3].
39
Fabio Vitali, A Standard-Based Approach for the Management of Legislative Documents, in
LEGISLATIVE XML FOR THE SEMANTIC WEB 35–48 (Giovanni Sartor et. al eds., 2011).
40
A form of language used in web programming to allow users to identify individual elements of a
document. See LECTURE SLIDES, Web Programming, https://home.adelphi.edu/~siegfried/cs390/390l6.
pdf [https://perma.cc/QWQ7-5K2F].
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embedded into the text in order for a computer to understand it. That is, the
document must be deconstructed and sorted into components based on
structure and semantics. Structure is defined as the organization and
categorization of various parts of the document on the basis of
functionality.41 Semantics, on the other hand, is defined as the meaning, or
what the information within the document represents. The intention, then, of
decomposing documents into respective structural and semantic framings
enables developing a taxonomy and ontology around organizing legislative
information.
In effect, standardization is an argument for drawing out and weaving
similarities between legislative documents across various jurisdictions. The
aim is to increase accessibility and fortify interoperability within the legal
ecosystem.42 As opposed to the existing ad-hoc, or piecemeal, method, the
application of a standard technique would encourage transparency in the
production and dissemination of legislative information.
As an initial response to a United Nations project to strengthen
information systems in legislatures in Africa, a set of standards and
guidelines for digital Parliament services, known as the Architecture for
Knowledge-Oriented Management of Any Normative Texts using Open
Standards and Ontologies (Akoma-Ntoso), was developed.43 This framework
sought to manage information and recommend technical policies and
specifications for building Parliament information systems.44 The results of
Akoma-Ntoso led to the three key achievements: (1) the Akoma-Ntoso XML
schema, (2) a labelling convention for legal resource identification (URI),
and (3) Legislative Drafting Guidelines.45 These achievements reflect the
broader vision on the use of XML to provide a stronger structural and
semantic framework around organizing parliamentary and legislative
information. The Akoma-Ntoso XML schema, in particular, enables the
inclusion of descriptive structure to the content of legislative documents and,
thereby, provides context to legislative information.46
The Akoma-Ntoso architecture has been revered as the bedrock on
which LegalXML is built.47 There are two key principles that are
fundamental to the schema: (1) descriptiveness and (2) prescriptiveness. The

41

Vitali, supra note 38, at 39.
See id. at 38-42.
43
Monica Palmirani & Fabio Vitali, Akoma-Ntoso for Legal Documents, in LEGISLATIVE XML FOR
THE SEMANTIC WEB 75–100 (Giovanni Sartor et. al eds. 2011).
44
See id. at 75.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 76.
47
Id.
42
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former emphasizes the preservation of the original “descriptiveness” of the
document. This suggests that there is no loss in the integrity of the legislative
document, specifically qualitative components that provide important legal
or regulatory context. The latter focuses on the implementation of rules
“directly drawn from the legal domain.”48 Together, these principles imply
and, perhaps, reaffirm the notion that it may be possible to sort within legal
documents elements that are inherently executable and structured and others
that require detail and particularity. More importantly, Akoma-Ntoso places
a focus on the representation and validity of legal documents.49 The design
purports to place at the forefront a proper reflection of legal concepts.
Monica Palmirani and Fabio Vitali describe four generations of
LegalXML, with Akoma–Ntoso understood as part of the third generation.50
Though the differences between generations is primarily based on nuances
of structuring, the third generation onward relies on a thorough
understanding of object-oriented design. That is, an assessment of patterns
and classifications are coupled with an analysis of the relationships between
text, structure, and metadata.51 This process is central to the schema and
translation of legal concepts.
In effect, the third generation establishes the “complex multilayered
information architecture”52 that decomposes the legal document from pure
text to structured analysis. This multilevel construction is described as a
semantic web layer cake.53 Modelling the document into layers—text,
structure, metadata, and ontology—aligns again with the implied argument
that the content of legislative documents is innately categorical. That is, as
opposed to a reconfiguration, or a reframing, of the document, it is instead a
question of rearrangement and extraction of these structured elements.

48

Id. at 77.
See id. at 76–77.
50
Id. at 78.
51
See generally Megan Ma et al., Deconstructing Legal Text: Object-Oriented Design in Legal
Adjudication, MIT COMPUTATIONAL LAW REPORT (Nov. 20, 2020), https://law.mit.edu/pub/
deconstructinglegaltext/release/1 [https://perma.cc/R9QX-DYKW].
52
Palmirani & Vitali, supra note 42, at 78.
53
Id. at 79.
49
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How, then, does LegalXML work? Below are examples54 of how the
layers are drafted in Akoma–Ntoso XML schema and how the relationships
between these layers operate. Beginning with the text and structure layers,
both layers take from the original natural language and annotate each
element semantically. As notable in the examples, the text and structural
markup (denoted by </> parameters), indicate to the machine how the
document is organized. Textually, it highlights between paragraphs and
references. Structurally, it highlights headers, sections, and subsections.

54

118

All examples are taken directly from Palmirani and Vitali’s demonstration in their article. See id.
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At the metadata layer, annotations become more complex. As opposed
to indicating a legislative document’s logical connectors and organization,
metadata represents the interpretation and context of the document. In the
example below, the left panel of the screen represents a textual markup of a
particular section of legislation. The right panel reveals the underlying
possibility for multiple interpretations of this section. Therefore, the <mod
id=mod1> denotes that for this specific case, there may be two equally valid
interpretations: (1) authentic or (2) exception.55

Moreover, metadata annotations clarify the “local” meaning.56 For
reasons of simplification and uniformity across categorization, Akoma–
Ntoso intentionally uses a single convention for all documents. This enables
a “shared conceptual architecture”57 across the legal ecosystem. Therefore,
to avoid confusion, the metadata annotates the specific meaning at hand.
Below, the docProponent refers to the source of authority. In the left panel,
the legislation indicates that the legal authority draws from the Ministry of
Local Government. The right panel indicates that the source draws from the
Supreme Court of Appeal.

55
56
57

Id. at 82.
See id.
Id.

119

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

Equally, this shared vocabulary behaves as a legal ontology. It indicates
how components of legislative documents belong to broader categories
within a legal ecosystem. In the aforementioned, the metadata annotations
reveal how a particular piece of legislation connects with other legal
documents. More importantly, it localizes where specific interpretations are
drawn. This substantiates a more explicit approach to the gathering and
understanding of legal knowledge.
Akoma-Ntoso then fulfills the desires of logicians for a legal language
that is sufficiently precise. Returning to Allen, if legislation should have a
clear structure, Akoma-Ntoso appears as an ideal option. Yet, the rate of its
adoption has been strikingly low.58 This is perhaps owed to the two-fold
complexity of migrating legislative documents from text to XML and the
requirement of XML competency in the translation process. First, converting
legislation from natural language to an XML schema is described as an eightstep recipe.59 Importantly, it requires first a legal analysis that is typically
done on paper. As described by Palmirani and Vitali, the legal expert must
meticulously and manually conduct the process—sorting within legal
documents the text, structure, metadata, and ontology. As well, the legal

58

See Use Cases, AKOMA NOTOSO, http://www.akomantoso.org/?page_id=275 [https://perma.cc/
W5SQ-J7YL].
59
Palmirani and Vitali describe in further detail the process of taking text and structuring. See
Palmirani & Vitali, supra note 42, at 91–98.
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expert must be fluent in Akoma-Ntoso, correctly annotating the elements and
identifying the legal relationships latent in the documents.
In effect, though Akoma-Ntoso offers benefits of making legal
language machine-readable and preserves the richness of legal concepts, its
use requires significant costs. The process is rather laborious, and few legal
experts60 currently have the technical skills to draft in XML schema.
Consequently, this has contributed to rather lackluster enthusiasm for its
adoption.
IV. OLD WINE IN NEW BOTTLES: RULES AS CODE
Still, machine-readable legislation has received renewed popularity.
This is perhaps owed to the release of the recent OECD Observatory of
Public Sector Innovation Report titled, “Cracking the Code: Rulemaking for
Humans and Machines” (OECD Report). The OECD Report articulates how
machine-consumable legislation, defined as machines understanding and
actioning rules consistently, reduces the need for individual interpretation
and translation61 and “helps ensure the implementation of rules better
matches their original intent.”62 This methodology enables the government
to produce logic expressed as a conceptual model—in effect, a blueprint of
the legislation.
These ideas are reminiscent of Anthony Casey and Anthony Niblett’s
thought experiment on the micro-directive.63 Interestingly, one of the
underlying fascinations with Rules as Code lies in the types of statutes
subject to digital transformation. Rules as Code applies two general practices
of ‘code-ification’: (1) programming tasks and (2) knowledge-based
systems. The former is more direct, while the latter poses epistemic
challenges. Programming tasks may be defined as a legislative calculator;
the legal questions asked are already known and understood in advance.
Typically, these tools are designed to assess eligibility, particularly in the
fields of taxation and benefits law. OpenFisca, the most widely known
60

It must be noted that the XML vocabulary and schemas are open-source and publicly available.
This suggests that while the documentation is available, it continues to remain limited amongst those
willing to adopt the practice. See, e.g., OASIS LegalDocumentML, supra note 37.
61
JAMES MOHUN & ALEX ROBERTS, CRACKING THE CODE: RULEMAKING FOR HUMANS AND
MACHINES 19 (2020).
62
Id. at 22.
63
To recall, in this futuristic construct, lawmakers would only be required to set general policy
objectives. Machines would bear the responsibility to examine their application in all possible contexts,
creating a depository of legal rules that best achieve such objectives. The legal rules generated would
then be converted into micro-directives that subsequently regulate how actors should comply with the
law. See Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, The Death of Rules and Standards 1–6 (Univ. of Chi.
Coase-Sandor Inst. for L. and Econ., Working Paper No. 738, 2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2693826
[https://perma.cc/HG9U-TW77].
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example, is an open-source platform that writes rules as code. The available
code focuses on legislation that “can be expressed as an arithmetic
operation.”64
Knowledge-based systems, on the other hand, encode rules required to
arrive at a specific legal question. That is, these tools consist of logical
algorithms that help identify the legal knowledge to be gathered from a
particular statute. They come from the lineage of expert systems and logic
programming. DataLex Knowledge-Base Development Tools (DataLex), for
instance, is a rules-based legal inferencing platform that draws, from
legislative texts, conclusions based on antecedents. In effect, the DataLex
software is powered on propositional logic.65
Despite differences between practices of ‘code-ification,’ the types of
legislation amenable to a Rules as Code approach predicate on an inherently
mathematical structure. This suggests that for legislation with clear
formulaic rules, expression in symbolic logic is intrinsically available.
Ruleness becomes the essential ingredient. The OECD Report, however,
does not distinguish between types of legislation and, rather, conflates
legislation under a seemingly uniform banner.
Though the OECD Report succeeded in providing a comprehensive
overview of Rules as Code, there remains a gap around the practical
implementation and the form machine-readable legislation should take. The
OECD Report anticipates three approaches to building machine-consumable
legislation: (1) a manual coding of the legislation across a multidisciplinary
team; (2) the use of semantic technologies; and (3) a domain model-based
regulation, whereby the government would create an official model of rules
to then convert to software languages.66 These approaches drew inspiration
from a deeper analysis on the levels of digitization.67 Unlike Meng Weng
Wong’s aspirational vision for machine-readability, the OECD Report is
agnostic to these possible methods.
Recent implementations of Rules as Code have surfaced globally.
Currently, the most prominent example is found in Australia. In the summer
of 2020, the New South Wales (NSW) Government released its first Rules

64
See Before You Start, OPENFISCA, https://openfisca.org/doc/ [https://perma.cc/6XQ4-32YT]. For
further details on how to ‘translate’ from law to code; From Law to Code, OPENFISCA,
https://openfisca.org/doc/coding-the-legislation/index.html [https://perma.cc/UX89-KX87].
65
Andrew Mowbray, Philip Chung & Graham Greenleaf, The DataLex Legislation Preprocessor
for Rules as Code, DATALEX (May 3, 2021), http://austlii.community/foswiki/pub/DataLex/WebHome/
ylegis-intro.pdf [https://perma.cc/47E7-KMBJ].
66
MOHUN & ROBERTS, supra 60 at 63–66.
67
See generally MENG WENG WONG, RULES AS CODE – SEVEN LEVELS OF DIGITISATION (2020).
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as Code legislation to reduce ambiguity and simplify interpretation.68 Built
on the OpenFisca platform,69 the Community Gaming Regulation 2020
(Gaming Regulation) identifies “the conditions for running community
games by different charities, not-for-profits and businesses in NSW.”70 The
Gaming Regulation is drafted in several forms: machine-readable, humanreadable, and on a computing interface. Perhaps its most incredible
achievement is the publicly available digital version of the Gaming
Regulation. The NSW Fair Trading website enables those engaging with the
regulation to determine whether their activity is permissible and if an
authority is required to conduct the activity.71 This website is considered a
“single source of truth” that will increase transparency and efficiency by
reducing time spent understanding the regulation and providing easily
digestible responses to particular situations of concern.72 The website offers
information on various sections of the legislation in plain language. The prize
jewel, however, is its questionnaire.
In experimenting with the website’s questionnaire, the “Community
Gaming Check,”73 the key content behind the legislation appears to be
logically reducible and fundamentally arithmetic. Below are two sample
snapshots of completed questionnaires:

68

In an Australian First, NSW is Translating Rules as Code to Make Compliance Easy, NSW
GOVERNMENT, https://www.digital.nsw.gov.au/success-stories/australian-first-nsw-translating-rulescode-make-compliance-easy [https://perma.cc/9RW4-6RRE].
69
To see the regulation housed on the OpenFisca platform, see Openfisca-Nsw-Base Web API, NSW
GOVERNMENT, HTTP://NSW-RULES-DEV.HEROKUAPP.COM/SWAGGER [https://perma.cc/7ZB2-QB77].
70
In an Australian First, NSW is Translating Rules as Code to Make Compliance Easy, supra note
67.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
For further detail and/or to experiment with the questionnaire, see Community Gaming Check,
NSW GOVERNMENT FAIR TRADING, https://www.fairtrading.nsw.gov.au/community-gaming/
community-gaming-regulation-check, [https://perma.cc/5BCL-UHF6]. For the machine-readable
version of the legislation, see Openfisca-NSW, GITHUB, https://github.com/Openfisca-NSW/openfisca_
nsw_community_gaming [https://perma.cc/J9KC-WQCM].
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Presumably, for the purposes of simplification, the questions are either
drafted in binary or are numerically driven. As a result, the Community
Game Check (CGC) will compute a response in the affirmative or negative.
The underlying assumption of the CGC is that the legislation raises one of
two questions: (1) determining whether a community game is admissible or
(2) if authority is required. Again, it may be reaffirmed that Rules as Code
focuses on prescription and rules; description continues to fall within the
jurisdiction of the original natural language version. Underlying this focus is
the assumption that legislation is largely mathematical and that legislative
questions may be solved through predicate logic.
Alternatively, the Rules as Code initiative sparked more granular
innovations, including formal languages compatible for its drafting and
expression. Catala, “a new programming language created by lawyers and
computer scientists for quantitative statute formalization,”74 is a proposed
solution for computing tax and benefits legislation. In their article, Denis
Merigoux and Liane Huttner explore the issues of existing expert systems
used for tax and benefits law. They first outline that the use of antiquated
code—programming languages that “exceeded the tenure of its original
programmers”75—risks the inability of adapting to new functional demands.
This has evident ramifications, provided the evolving nature of legislation.

74
DENIS MERIGOUX & LIANE HUTTNER, CATALA: MOVING TOWARDS THE FUTURE OF LEGAL
EXPERT SYSTEMS 1 (2020).
75
Id. at 2.
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Equally, they explore the pitfalls of using existing algorithmic tools for tax
collection that has led to both miscalculations and barriers with revision.76
Their recommendation is to use formal methods coupled with literate
pair programming in order to tackle the aforementioned issues. First, literate
pair programming is a hybridized understanding of literate and pair
programming in software development.77 Merigoux and Huttner suggest that
a combination of these methods, and between a lawyer and a computer
scientist, enable quality assurance in the translation of law to code. The lineby-line annotation of statutory texts allows for a “local discussion” on the
“lawful interpretations of the statutes.”78 Evidently, this recommendation
aligns closely with one of the OECD Report’s anticipated approaches to
building machine-consumable legislation: a manual coding of the legislation
across a multidisciplinary team. However, the more pressing question is the
use of formal methods.
Formal methods are a restructuring of abstract concepts to
“mathematical objects.”79 Formal methods act as mathematical proofs,
determining functional equivalence.80 Effectively, it is reminiscent of
Carnap’s logical syntax and treatment of language as a calculus. As a result,
this practice depends on the existing and inherent formal structure of the
legislation.81 This again reinforces the requirement of ruleness in Rules as
Code. Consequently, while Merigoux and Huttner’s recommendations
ensure that legal quality is maintained, Catala’s benefits remain within the
limited scope of intrinsically quantifiable legislation.
Looking outside law again for insight into how it might be possible to
describe meaning consistently to the language of law, there are more
opportunities for insight. This approach of abstracting formal texts into
different layers that might be understood in different circumstances is in line
with Karl Friston’s work on contemporary work in computational
neuroscience, i.e. the formal methods for understanding and distinguishing
between the existence and non-existence of observed phenomena as
represented in a Makrov blanket.82 So, while the medium of law informs its
message, ultimately the broader understanding of the conceptual boundaries
76

Id. at 3.
Literate programming is described as line-by-line annotations, while pair programming is pairing
two programmers in the production of code. For further detail, see id. at 7.
78
Id.
79
Id. at 6.
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Id.
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Merigoux and Huttner state explicitly the assumption of expression in mathematical terms as well
as the “formal specification” of statutes. See MERIGOUX & HUTTNER, supra note 73.
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Karl Friston, A Free Energy Principle for a Particular Physics (June 24, 2019) (unpublished
manuscript) https://arxiv.org/pdf/1906.10184.pdf [https://perma.cc/8AEE-6G9T].
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of law, even from a neuroscientific level, needs to be represented by
accounting for different of the various active and sensory states that are
observed when seeking to answer questions like ‘what is a rule?’
V. LEGISLATIVE TINKERING
Recent implementations of Rules as Code fortify the argument that,
currently, machine-consumable legislation is limited to highly structured
legislation. Nevertheless, these examples leave one question fundamentally
unanswered: what should be the role of machine-readable legislation? Is it
simply a ‘coded’ version of the legislation, or is it a parallel alternative that
is legally authoritative? Or is it a domain model of regulation from which
third parties derive their own versions, akin to an open-source code? These
three scenarios have their own sets of implications. Only in clarifying the
role of machine-readable legislation would a fruitful assessment of how
capable logic syntax and symbolic language are of representing legal
knowledge.
A. Authoritative Conundrum
New Zealand released in March 2021 its own version of the OECD
Report, “Legislation as Code for New Zealand: Opportunities, Risks, and
Recommendations” (Legislation as Code Report). One of the key
conclusions of the report calls for a distinction between competence and
desire. That is, even if legislation may be drafted in code, it should not be.
Unlike the OECD Report, the Legislation as Code Report takes a strong
stance on the role of machine-consumable legislation. The report argues that
rules drafted in code “should remain subordinate to legislation,” stating that
“enacting code creates serious constitutional confusion and risks
undermining the separation of powers.”83
This is owed to the law’s “technological use of written natural
language;” whereby the use and interpretation of words keeps in balance the
structure of the law with its institutions.84 As code does not have the same
interpretive space as natural language, this runs the risk of the judiciary being
unable to perform its constitutional role relative to statutory interpretation.85
Accordingly, the inability to invalidate legislation for inconsistency, given
interpretative barriers with code, would “degrade[] the rule of law.”86
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TOM BARRACLOUGH ET AL., LEGISLATION AS CODE FOR NEW ZEALAND: OPPORTUNITIES, RISKS,
3 (2021).
Id. at 9.
Id. at 58.
Id.
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B. Language Shopping
The Legislation as Code Report further contrasts the OECD Report by
concluding that parallel drafting is not a solution, but simply a mitigator to
issues of interpretation.87 Provided that perfect translation does not exist,
there is inevitably potential for meaning to diverge even if a common intent
is established. Therefore, while an encoded version arguably reflects an
interpretation of the law,88 machine-consumable legislation that has legal
authority raises, equally, issues analogous to both legislative bilingualism
and bijuralism.89 This could foreseeably create statutes with multiple
personalities, having dissonance between linguistic variants and heightening
ambiguity in interpretation.
In this regard, Canada is an informative example. In 1995, the formal
adoption of legislative bijuralism led to an acknowledgment of four legal
audiences in Canada—that there is a “right to read federal legislation in the
official language of their choice and to find in that legislation terminology
and wording [to be] consistent with the system of private law in effect in
their province or territory.”90 As such, the constitutional requirement for all
legislation to be written bilingually forcibly produced makeshift equivalents
in legislation, devised without standard nor appropriate concern for the
problems of interpretation.
There are two models of producing bilingual legislation: translation and
co-drafting. While they are perceived as distinct, the process around crafting
bilingual legislation often involves a hybridization of both. This typically
results in a conceptual mismatch between one language to the other. Michael
J. B. Wood provides a fascinating illustration through the word ‘any.’91
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Id. at 3.
In fact, the Legislation as Code Report suggests that it may be useful to focus on the opportunities
for approaches of non-authoritative implementations of Rules as Code. See id. at 9.
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Lionel A. Levert, Harmonization and Dissonance: Language and Law in Canada and Europe,
GOVERNMENT OF CANADA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (May 7, 1999), https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rppr/csj-sjc/harmonization/hfl-hlf/b1-f1/bf1e.html [https://perma.cc/3U2Q-5Q7P].
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Michael J.B. Wood, Drafting Bilingual Legislation in Canada: Examples of Beneficial CrossPollination Between the Two Language Versions, 17 STATUTE L. REV. 66, 70 (1996).
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In the English language, ‘any,’ in the affirmative, describes ‘one’ out of
a specific list. In the above example, the intention of the drafter may be to
indicate that, should there be documents specified in the schedule, they
should be included. However, to the reader, it may suggest that any one of
the documents specified in the schedule should be included. Consequently,
in the French language example, there produces two variants. This lack of
equivalence in the word ‘any’ produces ambiguity between versions of the
legislation. Both of which have equal authority under Canadian law. Wood
discusses other examples including pronominal phrases such as ‘thereof’ and
chains of qualifiers.92 In the former, phrases of this type often foster
confusion, particularly in co-referencing.93 As well, there are no direct
equivalents in French. In the latter, the Germanic origins of the English
language allow nouns and adjectives to be chained together. This use of
grammar does not exist in French. Instead, the French language applies a
series of modifying phrases. Consequently, if meaning is unclear and
ambiguous in English, there is potential for further complication in French.94
Likewise, the presence of both civil and common law systems within
Canada has led to complications with the translatability of legal concepts.
Bijuralism stipulates the requirement to have proper terminology and notions
present across both systems of private law in Canada. To achieve this
requirement, the most frequent methods used are the “neutrality technique”
and the “doublet.”95 The former is simply the use of ‘neutral’ terms or phrases
in defining concepts without particular connection to either one of the
systems. The latter is to enable the co-existence of legal concepts when there
is no functional equivalence. In cases of the doublet, both versions of the
legislation “retain their separate identities.”96 This means that paragraphs
within the same legislation may have intentional signposts to direct how the
rule of law is to be applied depending on the system.97 Typically, both
expressions of the legal concept appear one after the other in each language
version.
Evidently, problems of interpretation arise as “civil law terms are
juxtaposed with common law expressions.”98 Within the country, there were
issues symptomatic of conflict of laws; whereby courts applied common law
definitions to jurisdictions that followed civil law systems. This led to
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inconsistencies in precedent, as civil and common law terminology were
used interchangeably without proper regard for the nuances of legality
between each system’s interpretations.
Canada has since made remarkable strides in legislative bilingualism
and bijuralism. This was owed to a reframing of federal requirements as a
strain of comparative law, as well as the subsequent emergence of
jurilinguists—otherwise, experts trained in both systems.99 Returning to
machine-readability and authoritative code, what are some lessons that can
be drawn from the Canadian experience? First, there has been a rise in
interdisciplinary training between law and computer science. Mireille
Hildebrandt’s recent textbook is a prime example. Law for Computer
Scientists and Other Folk, as she describes, is an endeavor to “bridge the
disciplinary gaps” and “present a reasonably coherent picture of the
vocabulary and grammar of modern positive law.”100 As well, law schools
are beginning to offer technology and innovation courses including training
in computer programming.101 This is facilitating a growth and demand in
experts fluent in both disciplines.102 Moreover, as evidenced, co-drafting can
be seen in the recommendations and development of machine-readable
languages like Catala.
There remains, however, a significant gap in both reconciling and
harmonizing legal concepts between code and natural language. Perhaps the
deeper question is whether and how that may be possible. In Canada,
common and civil law terminology come from existing traditions of private
law. Their respective expressions are rooted in legal history. However, there
is neither a comparable legal system nor a comparative field of law for code.
That is, code could only potentially extend as an alternative language, but
not as a system of norms. The functional limitations of code could only be
interpreted as linguistic limits, whereas normative principles of
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University of Ottawa and department of jurilinguistics produced both common law terminology in
French and civil law terminology in English. This pioneering work offered the potential to better capture
the necessary distinctions and comparisons between the two systems of law. See id.
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MIREILLE HILDEBRANDT, LAW FOR COMPUTER SCIENTISTS AND OTHER FOLK 3 (2020).
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Law schools are beginning to offer courses in technical development, including computer
programming. Moreover, they are offering classes that apply design-thinking to legal studies and were
developed with the intention of acknowledging technology as a powerful driving force in law. Consider
Harvard Law School and Georgetown Law School’s Computer Programming for Lawyers classes,
Innovation Labs at Northwestern Law School, or The Design Lab at Stanford Law School. See, e.g.,
Computer Programming for Lawyers, HARV. L. SCH., https://hls.harvard.edu/academics/curriculum/
catalog/default.aspx?o=75487 [https://perma.cc/W58M-K4LL].
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See David Freeman Engstrom & Daniel E. Ho, Artificially Intelligent Government: A Review and
Agenda, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON BIG DATA LAW 57, 65–66 (Roland Vogl ed., 2021) (“Embedded
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129

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

programming and computer science could never be perceived as parallel
legal principles. As a result, the discussion raised in the Legislation as Code
Report, on the risk of authoritative code degrading the rule of law, is a
critique of code as a legal mechanism. The complexity lies in the extent to
which the linguistic medium has the capacity to alter the integrity and
character of the law, even if the intention of its use is simply expression.
C. The Alchemy of Legal Architecture
Perhaps the most understated challenge with Rules as Code hinges on
the legal infrastructure.103 Across several possible approaches to machinereadable legislation, there remains unresolved questions of design and
interoperability between legal documents. That is, if a new symbolic
language, like code, effectively enforces a controlled grammar, what are its
implications as it moves across the legal ecosystem and, in particular, its
interactions with various legal sources?
Reflecting back on the Legislation as Code Report, one important
argument raised is the acknowledgment of legislation as “one component
among many that comprise the wider system of laws and rules.”104 Statutes
frequently reference one another, highlighting a “process of synthesizing
multiple inputs into a contextually dependent output.”105 Provided that
legislation are not perceivably independent texts, it is then important to
consider how machine-readable legislation works in tandem with other legal
documents.
In the OECD Report, the discussed approach for a domain model-based
regulation is one that raises persistent queries on interoperability. Should
there be a government-endorsed model from which legislation will be
converted into third-party machine-readable versions, this could create
inconsistent interpretations, thereby testing the legal limits of the model.
Currently, there is no standard for how the model translates to individual
policies. More importantly, what might be issues of fit between various
machine-readable documents, such as between machine-readable legislation
to machine-readable contracts?
In late December 2020, the University of Cambridge announced the
launch of the Regulatory Genome Project.106 As opposed to legislation, the
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focus of the project is on regulation, specifically financial regulation. The
Regulatory Genome Project intentionally steers away from regulation as
code and considers the notion of ‘sequencing.’107 Rather than translation,
regulatory information will be extracted and placed in a data repository. The
regulatory data will then be organized into a taxonomy. In accordance with
the taxonomy, experts will annotate key information and build a training set.
This model will then be used to subsequently generate machine-readable
regulatory documents. In effect, it is a process of retrieving the contents of
regulation from an openly accessible platform that bears a specific
framework of capturing the regulatory data. This permits a single source of
‘truth’ and a common standard for accessing machine-readable regulatory
information.
The significance of this approach is its departure from language design.
That is, as opposed to dwelling on the semantic conversion of natural
language to code, the project turns its attention to the information contained
in regulation. It is simply a complete rewrite, or paradigm shift, of digesting
regulation. Beyond an interdisciplinary collaboration, the Regulatory
Genome Project has received the support of regulators, authoritative figures
of the community, to validate and refine the taxonomies to enable effective
benchmarking across jurisdictions globally.108 Interestingly, this parallels an
amalgam of the Rules as Code domain-model with the Legislation as Code
argument that the variability of interpretations would be limited if
authoritative interpretations are made available.109
As a result, the Regulatory Genome Project offers an unconventional
method for machine-readability. Evidently, this may be simpler with
regulation than it is with legislation. Namely, legal authority operates
differently than regulatory authority. In considering this approach, the
challenge would be systemic and one that requires convincing a complex
network of legislative and judicial power to construct laws on an entirely
separate paradigm. Nonetheless, it offers a perspective on mediums of
communication and computational modelling that extends beyond language
to a level of further granularity: data.
Existing literature has focused on the promise of Rules as Code as the
magical formula for increased clarity and precision in legislative drafting.
Undeniably, machine-readable legislation has deep-seated roots in logical
syntax and symbolic language. The Legislation as Code Report, however,
highlights that further discussion is required in better defining both the legal
107
The Regulatory Genome Project, THE REGULATORY GENOME, https://www.regulatorygenome
.org/ [perma.cc/7GLY-CG2E].
108
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function and status of machine-consumable legislation. Fundamentally,
machine-readable legislation requires a space for judicial and legal contest,
effectively an appeal process in the event of dispute.110
This is not to say there is no place for machine-readable legislation. In
fact, the Legislation as Code Report argues that computational models can
be commendable if the model is (1) “legally correct” and (2) there is
infrastructure in place “to assess how the law has been interpreted and
modelled.”111 For example, the Legislation as Code Report cites the
Auckland District Law Society’s Standard Form Agreement for Sale and
Purchase of Real Estate (ADLS Standard Form). The ADLS Standard Form
is described as an instrument that “embod[ies] a reliable interpretation of
multiple primary legal sources” and “indicate[s] the value that similar
interpretations might have if they are coded and modelled reliably, while
retaining the ability to scrutinise them through legal argument.”112 Provided
that this agreement has been drafted and revised within a dependable legal
environment, the ADLS Standard Form has demonstrated the potential for
reproducibility while maintaining certainty. This suggests that finding
existing natural language documents with an accepted standard and structure
may be appropriate for computational modelling.113 Again, this reinforces
that Rules as Code is available only in narrow-use cases, specifically,
legislation with inherent logical structures.
At a broader epistemological level, there remain limitations from the
perspective of knowledge representation which, in turn, forcibly demand a
reflection on the intentions and purpose of laws. The Regulatory Genome
Project has revealed that there may be an alternate option of consuming
information. As law has language at its core, interpretation has centered on
the linguistic exercise. This has led to a heavy reliance on translation when
reconciling human with machine-readability. However, lessons from core
linguistics suggest that natural language is composed of three underlying
components: syntax, semantics, and pragmatics. Curiously, the enduring
focus on the syntax and semantics in computational models has led to a
subsequent neglect of pragmatics, an arguably essential pillar in meaningmaking. Consequently, this impedes the capacity to appropriately understand
and contextualize legal concepts.
110
This is reminiscent of the argument raised in Kiel Brennan-Marquez and Stephen Henderson’s
article on the concept of role-reversibility integral to the legal system. See generally Kiel BrennanMarquez & Stephen E. Henderson, Artificial Intelligence and Role-Reversible Judgment, 109 J. CRIM. L.
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To recall, pragmatics is the field of linguistics that reflects on intention
using tools of implicature and inference. Implicature, in linguistics, is
defined as entailment, logically valid conclusions drawn between
sentences.114 Its counterpart, inference, is more complex. This is where
discrepancies may exist, as what is being implied may differ from what is
inferred. In accordance with Grice’s Cooperative Principle,115 the divergence
between intended implicature and inference suggests non-conventional
meaning. In effect, this supports the possibility of multiple interpretations on
the basis of variations in context.
Consider the phrase: ‘There is an elephant in the tree.’ Semantics is
helpful to the extent that it could raise what may be a prototype example of
an elephant. As elephants are not typically found in trees, this is immediately
a sign that this sentence may have a different meaning. Could this be a
metaphorical idiom (i.e., elephant in the room), or perhaps there is some
implicit understanding that the elephant in question is a paper elephant? To
recall, pragmatics raises the issue of reference. Consider the following
sentences: “Jane is speaking with Joanne. She is a legal scholar.”116 The
referent of ‘she’ is not clear. Without context, semantics alone cannot
usefully provide information as to the meaning of these sentences.
There are parallels to the shortcomings of semantics revealed in
propositional logic. Systems that use propositional logic, similarly to Rules
as Code structures, reflect the limitations presented in semantics. This is
because propositional logic can enable the validation of some statements but
cannot in itself establish the truth of all statements. So, why must there be
consideration for pragmatics in machine-readable legislation?
Joseph A. Grundfest and A.C. Pritchard discuss the “technology of
ambiguity” as a legislative strategy for compromise.117 Their article reaffirms
the notion of intentional, conscious ambiguity. As opposed to ambiguity as
a ‘bug,’ Grundfest and Pritchard argue that it is a feature of legislative
drafting. That is, ambiguity in the drafting process is intended to work in
tandem with the judiciary’s interpretative methods. Ambiguity, then, works
to ensure that the casuistic approach, characteristic of common law systems,
is upheld.
Contrary to the rhetoric on clarity and precision, ambiguity is revered
as an inherent property of statutory construction. While this is not necessarily
a novel argument, Grundfest and Pritchard reassert the interoperability of the
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legal system: that legal documents are not independent artifacts and instead
belong to a broader ecosystem. The aforementioned issues of pragmatics in
natural language are integrated into the fabric of law and legal text and
powered by the literary tools of metaphor and analogy that outline context.
Interestingly, code is not quite as transparent or reducible as assumed.
Mark C. Marino argues that code, like other systems of signification, cannot
be removed from context. Code is not the result of mathematical certainty
but “of collected cultural knowledge and convention (cultures of code and
coding languages), haste and insight, inspirations and observations,
evolutions and adaptations, rhetoric and reason, paradigms of language,
breakthroughs in approach, and failures to conceptualize.”118 While code
appears to be ‘solving’ the woes of imprecision and lack of clarity in legal
drafting, the use of code is, in fact, capturing meaning from a different
paradigm. Rather, code is “frequently recontextualized” and meaning is
“contingent upon and subject to the rhetorical triad of the speaker, audience
(both human and machine), and message.”119 It follows that code is not a
context-independent form of writing. The questions become whether there
could be a pragmatics of code, and, if so, how could code effectively
communicate legal concepts?
Marino articulates the “need to learn to read code critically.”120 Having
understood the complexities and pitfalls of natural language, there is now a
rising demand to understand the ways code acquires meaning and how
shifting contexts shape and reshape this meaning. Currently, few scholars
have addressed code beyond its operative capacity. This mirrors the focus on
syntax and semantics as primary drivers of using code for legal drafting. Yet,
learning how meaning is signified in code enables a deeper analysis of how
the relationships, contexts, and requirements of law may be rightfully
represented. From the science of (natural) language arises the science of
code.
Increasingly, there has been emerging literature on the application of
network analysis and graph theory to account for legal complexity. In a
recent article on the growth of the law, representations of legislative
materials were modelled using methods from network science and natural
language processing.121 The authors argue that quantifying law in a static
manner fails to represent the diverse relationships and the interconnectivity
of rules. They suggest that statutory materials should instead be represented
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using multidimensional, time-evolving document networks. As legal
documents are interlinked, networks better reflect the dynamics of their
language and the “deliberate design decisions made.”122 Moreover, it enables
“circumvent[ing] some of the ambiguity problems that natural languagebased approaches inherently face.”123 Most fascinating is the authors’
capacity to isolate, through graph clustering techniques, legal topics that
have fostered the most “complex bodies of legal rules.”124 This has enabled
a deeper understanding of the evolution of legal concepts and specific points
of inflection where their perceptions have shifted.125
What is particularly striking about this paper is the introduction of
quantitative approaches that stress content representation as opposed to
structural miming. This model considers importantly context that shapes
legal documents. How, then, could machine-readability be reconciled with
graphical representation of legal documents? Statutory and legislative
materials necessarily are situated at the heart of the legal ecosystem. That is,
legislative documents provide the foundation on which other legal
documents could gather concepts. This suggests that, as opposed to an
emphasis on semantic translation to machine-readable legislation, a
consideration of the role of legislation from an information extraction
perspective may be a promising alternative.
CONCLUSION
In analyzing the ‘coming-of-age’ of machine-readability, it becomes
strikingly clear that, even with current advancements, there remains a gap
around its role vis-à-vis ‘human-readable’ legislation.126 The complexity of
translating legislation from natural language to code stems from a persistent
conceptualization of legal documents as independent entities. Taken in
tandem with the practical ability of humans to write, code, understand, and
judge, the notion that a perfect encoding of a rule might exist seems farfetched. However, what is not far-fetched is encoding rules in a way that
improves the ability of lawyers, judges, and other legal professionals to
create antifragile systems and processes for disseminating legal
122

Id.
Id. at 2.
124
Id.
125
See id. (considering the discussion by the authors on the regulation of natural resources in the
United States shifting from exploitation to conservation).
126
See Douglas Hofstadter, The Shallowness of Google Translate, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 30, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/01/the-shallowness-of-google-translate/551570/
[https://perma.cc/AT8D-HL3F] (building on this idea further, Douglas Hofstadter examines how difficult
the concept of machine translation is in the broader context of general translation in his article in The
Atlantic).
123

135

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

knowledge.127 That is, instead of focusing on creating the perfect encoding
of a legal rule, what systems or processes could be created in order to more
consistently extract meaning from statutes?
Legal information must be understood at a systemic level to factor the
interaction of legal documents with one another across a temporally sensitive
frame. Therefore, legal texts should be perceived as objects, with code as the
semiotic vessel. How these objects interact, how references are made, and
how their histories interrelate must be accounted for. It appears then that a
dual-pronged method of semiotic analysis coupled with pragmatics
contribute to a more fruitful engagement of legal knowledge representation.
As opposed to applying an arithmetic lens in the name of clarity and
precision, language designed for machine-readability requires a multilayered approach that extends beyond syntactic structure and ensures
temporal management and formal ontological reference. Without these
considerations, machine-readable legislation could only remain in the realm
of a computable iteration.
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